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DEPRIVATION OF NATIONALITY AS A COUNTER-TERRORISM TOOL: A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CANADIAN AND DUTCH LEGISLATION  
TOM L. BOEKESTEIN 
 
I.  AT THE TIME OF WRITING, most major western countries are faced with a realistic 
scenario of terrorist attacks, and even those countries who have not yet been successfully targeted 
have increased their security efforts to prevent potential harm in the future. In addition to traditional 
criminal law measures and extended surveillance, several states now include their laws on 
nationality or citizenship in their counter-terrorism efforts.1 These countries have introduced and/or 
expanded their rules on revocation of nationality. Deprivation of nationality as such is not a new 
legal concept, however, but has always been accepted as being the flipside of the state’s 
competence to convey nationality.2 The use of deprivation in the context of counterterrorism, in 
contrast, is a rather recent invention that is somewhat reminiscent of the old practice of exiling 
criminals. Today, states deprive terrorists and/or foreign fighters3 of their nationality in response 
to certain actions that may or may not have been criminalized. The purpose is to prevent individuals 
from exercising their right to return, as states are generally obliged to readmit their own citizens to 
their territory and thus unable to deport them while they are nationals. Deprivation of nationality 
as a counter-terrorism tool is thus to be placed on the borderline between an administrative sanction 
and an act of criminal law punishment.4 Although the scope and underlying mechanisms of these 
measures differ greatly between states, two main categories of such legislation will be 
distinguished. 
The majority of states resorting to deprivation of nationality as a counter-terrorism tool do 
so in response to a criminal conviction, usually for a terrorist offence. The rationale is simple: a 
subject convicted of a terrorist crime can consequently be expatriated and will be removed from 
                                                 
1 For the purposes of this paper, the words citizenship and nationality are used interchangeably. 
2 L Van Waas, “Foreign Fighters and the Deprivation of Nationality: National Practices and International Law 
Implications”, in A De Grutty, F Capone & C Paulussen eds, Foreign Fighters under International Law and Beyond 
(The Hague: Springer, 2016), at 471-472. 
3 The term ‘foreign fighter’ generally refers to individuals who have left their home countries to join terrorist 
organizations abroad. These individuals are viewed as posing a significant risk once they return to their home country. 
4 S Lavi, “Citizenship Revocation as Punishment: On the Modern Duties of Citizens and their Criminal Breach”, 
(2011) 61 U Toronto LJ 783, at 784. 
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the country, thereby becoming unable to commit new attacks within said country. Far less states 
have resorted to more extensive deprivation, the paradigm example being certain Sections in the 
British Nationality Act (BNA).5 Here, deprivation has been disconnected from a foregoing criminal 
conviction and is thus more far-reaching. Yet the underlying rationale continues to be protection 
through exclusion. While it is possible to categorize deprivation of nationality along these two 
major lines, their implementation and application by various states differs widely. Actions that will 
most certainly result in a loss of nationality in one country may not have any such consequence in 
another. To highlight this new trend in nationality law and discuss the different developments in 
the states that follow it, a comparative analysis of the relevant aspects of Dutch and Canadian 
Citizenship Acts will be conducted. The scope of the analysis has been limited to these two 
jurisdictions, as they currently seem to be undergoing strictly antithetical developments in this 
field: Canada has, at the time of writing, repealed the sections of Bill C-24 which introduced the 
possibility of revoking the citizenship of subject who had been convicted of a terrorist offence.6 In 
contrast, the Netherlands introduced legislation similar to the Canadian Bill C-24 in 20107 which 
was expanded in 2016.8 It also inured denationalization laws9 that forego criminal conviction in 
March 2017.10 The Minister of Security and Justice gained discretionary power to revoke 
citizenship of people who are deemed a threat against national security, circumventing criminal 
law. These two countries have been selected because of the great legislative similarities at 
beginning of 2017 and the great differences resulting from amendments adopted by both only six 
months later. In addition to these initial similarities and diverging developments, the selection of 
the two countries is also based on the fundamental differences in the way they address the foreign 
                                                 
5 United Kingdom, British Nationality Act 1981, c. 61. 
6 Bill C-6, An Act to amend the Citizenship Act and to make consequential amendments to another Act, 1st Sess, 42nd 
Parl, 2017. 
7 Rijkswet van 17 juni 2010, houdende wijziging van de Rijkswet op het Nederlanderschap met betrekking tot 
meervoudige nationaliteit en andere nationaliteitsrechtelijke kwesties, 2010, Stb. 2010, 242. 
8 Rijkswet van 5 maart 2016, wijziging van de Rijkswet op het Nederlanderschap ter verruiming van de mogelijkheden 
voor het ontnemen van het Nederlanderschap bij terroristische misdrijven, 2016, Stb. 2016/121. 
9 For the purposes of this paper, ‘denationalisation’, ‘revocation (of nationality)’, and ‘deprivation (of nationality)’ will 
be used interchangeably.  
10 Rijkswet van 10 februari 2017, wijziging van de Rijkswet op het Nederlanderschap in verband met het intrekken van 
het Nederlanderschap in het belang van de nationale veiligheid, 2017, Stb. 2017, 52; Article II of Besluit van 10 
februari 2017, wijziging van het Besluit verkrijging en verlies Nederlanderschap met het oog op het vaststellen van de 
elementen die betrokken worden bij de belangenafweging inzake een besluit omtrent intrekking van het 
Nederlanderschap en tot vaststelling van het tijdstip van inwerkingtreding van de artikelen I en IB van de Rijkswet van 
10 februari 2017 tot wijziging van de Rijkswet op het Nederlanderschap in verband met het intrekken van het 
Nederlanderschap in het belang van de nationale veiligheid, 2017, Stb. 2017, 52, published on 28 February 2017 in 
Stb. 2017, 67.  




fighter threat. A comparative analysis therefore offers important insights into the function of 
denationalization in different counter-terrorism strategies and its necessity and effectiveness. 
Finally, while the Netherlands provide a classic example of the general international trend to resort 
to nationality law as an anti-terrorism measure, the Canadian approach offers an alternative to this 
that highlights the shortcomings of these laws in particular and offers different approach to counter 
the threat posed by returning foreign fighters effectively. 
This paper will compare the recent changes in Canadian and Dutch nationality law, taking 
into account the respective lawmaker’s positions on legislation of both types as well as criticism 
raised against these laws. It will be assessed how Canada and the Netherlands use such legislation 
to counter the threat posed by returning foreign fighters. Before addressing Dutch and Canadian 
law in more detail, this paper will classify the various types of legislation that exist in national 
systems into two categories. In doing so, an overview of the rules on deprivation of nationality in 
counter-terrorism currently in force in a wide range of western and non-western countries will be 
provided. The purpose of this is not to provide an in-depth discussion of these laws, but rather to 
showcase the different manifestations of both types of law and their widespread use, thereby 
putting the recent legislative developments in Canada and the Netherlands into perspective. It will 
also elaborate on the difficulties inherent in such categorization due to the fact that domestic 
legislation on deprivation of nationality differs widely. After having sketched out the background, 
this paper will analyze the relevant provisions of both Canadian and Dutch nationality law, 
including a comparison of the current legislation and recent developments. The counter-terrorism 
strategies of both countries, specifically with regard to foreign fighters, will also be discussed and 
taken into consideration as it provides the backdrop against which the denationalization laws 
operate. In sum, the general counter-terrorism context, the legislative background of the 
denationalization measures as such, and the criticism directed at these laws will be used to explain 
the functioning of these laws and the diverging developments in Dutch and Canadian nationality 
law. Ultimately, this paper will reach a conclusion on the extent to which Dutch and Canadian laws 
diverge in this regard and explain these developments in their respective contexts.  
II. DEPRIVATION OF NATIONALITY AS A COUNTER-TERRORISM MEASURE  
A. NEW USES FOR DEPRIVATION OF NATIONALITY 
Recent changes in nationality law that respond to the growing threat of terrorist attacks show the 
rise of new forms of legislation permitting deprivation. Before the recent changes, states had largely 
26 THE TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS REVIEW                                                [VOL 5] 
 
limited deprivation of nationality to the few cases where it had been fraudulently obtained and 
refrained from extending its use into the national security context.11 In recent years, however, states 
have (re)discovered old and new uses for deprivation in the context of counter-terrorism.12 Several 
states have adopted laws that allow for deprivation of nationality on ever broader grounds for the 
purpose of protecting national security and preventing terrorist attacks.13 In general, recently 
adopted forms of this legislation can be classified into two types, which will be established below 
and substantiated with a limited discussion of some examples from selected domestic legislation. 
B. TWO TYPES OF LEGISLATION 
The two types of legislation allowing for the denationalization of (suspected) terrorists can be 
distinguished on the basis of the underlying requirements that trigger their application. The first 
type can be referred to as reactive deprivation of nationality. Legislation of this type commonly 
requires the individual to have been convicted of a terrorism offence defined in the state’s criminal 
code: a paradigm example is Section 10(2)b of the pre-2017 Canadian Citizenship Act, which 
requires a conviction for a ‘terrorism offence as defined in Section 2 of the Criminal Code’, before 
citizenship can be revoked. The example clearly demonstrates the purpose of the legislation: by 
revoking the nationality of an individual who has committed a terrorist offence, the affected state 
can easily remove that individual from its territory, and effectively bar such individual from re-
entering, as well as from committing another offence.14 The legislation has preventive, deterring, 
and punitive effects. Furthermore, it should be noted that the underlying offences do not necessarily 
require the commission of an actual terrorist attack, as more and more states criminalize purely 
                                                 
11 Revocation of nationality in cases of fraud is a common practice, see GR De Groot and MP Vink., “A Comparative 
Analysis of Regulations on Involuntary Loss of Nationality in the European Union” in SC Nunez and GR de Groot, 
eds, European Citizenship at the Crossroads – The Role of the European Union on Loss and Acquisition of Nationality 
(Oisterwijk: WLP, 2015), at 64-67; Van Waas (2016), supra note 2 at 470-471; in the UK, until 2006 fraud constituted 
the only ground for revocation of nationality, see SD Wood, “No Going Home: An Analysis of U.S. and U.K. 
Expatriation Laws as Applied to the Current Crisis in Iraq and Syria”, (2015-2016) 25 Transnat'l L & Contemp Probs 
229, at 243. 
12 A Macklin and R Bauböck eds, “The Return of Banishment: Do the New Denationalization Policies Weaken 
Citizenship?”, (2015) EUI Networking Papers RSCAS 2015/14, at 11; T Choudhury, “The Radicalization of 
Citizenship Deprivation” (2016) 37:2 Critical Social Policy 1 at 2.  
13 Paradigm examples for this are s 40 of the British Nationality Act 1981 c. 61, ss 33-35 of the Australian Citizenship 
Act 2007 as amended, C2016C00726, or s 10(2)b of the Citizenship Act 1985, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-29; see also Van 
Waas (2016), supra note 2 at 472; GR De Groot and MP Vink, EUDO Citizenship Policy Brief No. 3: Loss of 
Citizenship at 3. 
14 As nationals normally enjoy the right to remain within their country of nationality, as vested in article 12(4) 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 
1976). 




preparatory or supportive offences.15 Subtypes of reactive laws are manifold, and include inter alia 
the following:  
- Requirements that do not or only vaguely specify the offence that must be committed.16 
- Requirements that the conviction of the terrorist offence be punishable or actually punished 
with a minimum term of imprisonment.17 
- Requirements that include offences committed abroad provided that they would constitute a 
terrorism offence if they had been committed within the territory of the state.18 
- Legal constructions that assume voluntary revocation of citizenship where an individual 
performs certain criminal acts.19 
Regardless of the specific form assumed by legislation of this type, it is always reactive:  
some form of criminal conduct needs to be committed by the individual in response to which the 
citizenship is then lost, usually by a separate administrative decision taken at ministerial level. All 
of these subtypes are subject to indirect judicial review prior to the revocation. While the courts 
will not scrutinize the administrative decision itself, they are nevertheless engaged in determining 
whether the underlying offence and criminal conduct have actually been committed.  
The second, rarer type of legislation will be termed proactive deprivation of nationality. In 
contrast to its reactive counterpart, these laws do not require the commission of a specific criminal 
offence; they bypass the criminal law system, as denationalization will be triggered by certain non-
criminal acts.20 A terrorist attack must not necessarily have been committed, prepared, or aided. In 
the current fight against terrorism, the most prominent form of conduct leading to the revocation 
of nationality is the joining of a terrorist organization abroad, most often ISIS in Syria or Iraq. It 
cannot be overstated that legislation permitting proactive denationalization imposes a very low 
threshold; neither a criminal conviction, nor specific individual conduct contributing to the 
commission of an actual terrorist attack is required. In doing so, the judiciary is sidestepped in the 
                                                 
15 See i.a. §129a and b Strafgesetzbuch, published 13 November 1998|3322, as amended by Article 1 G v. 4.11.2016 I 
2460 (German Criminal Code); article 421 Wetboek van Strafrecht, BWBR0001854; Terrorism Act 2000, c. 11. 
16 See as an example s 34(2)b(ii) jo. (5) ACA. 
17 Canada requires the individual to be sentenced to at least five years of imprisonment (s10(1)b CCA). 
18 Again, s 10(2)b of the CCA provides a paradigm example for this type of legislation. 
19 Section 33AA ACA 2007; This type as also served as reasoning for the Canadian Bill C-24 discussed below, see the 
position taken by the former Canadian Minister of foreign affairs Chris Alexander in House of Commons Debates, 41st 
Parl, 2nd Sess, No 102 (12 June 2014) at 1900 (Hon Chris Alexander): “They [terrorists] will have, in effect, withdrawn 
their allegiance to Canada by these very acts.”; see in addition Macklin and Bauböck (Eds.) (2015), supra note 12 at 
13. 
20 Van Waas (2016) supra note 2 at 473. 
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process leading up to the revocation and will only be engaged if the withdrawal is later challenged. 
At the time of writing, three subtypes of this form of legislation have been identified: 
- Legislation that requires that the conduct of the individual shows that he has joined a certain 
organization that has been classified as being terrorist.21 
- Legislation under which citizenship can be revoked as soon as the individual acquires the 
citizenship of, or a right of residence in, a country deemed to be affiliated with terrorist 
organizations.22 
- Legislation that allows for the revocation of nationality where the competent Minister is 
convinced that this is in the public interest.23 
It is evident that proactive legislation, by its very nature, aims at the prevention of possible 
future offences, rather than responding to offences that have already been committed. Its rationale 
is as simple as it seems to be effective: individuals who have affiliated themselves with a terrorist 
organization in a foreign country will be unable to commit offences in their home country if they 
are barred from re-entering as a result of nationality revocation.24 Although the two types of 
legislation enumerated above are fundamentally different in their operation, their aims are 
remarkably similar. Nevertheless, proactive deprivation of nationality clearly is the more intrusive 
measure, as it is purely preventive and not subject indirectly to judicial review prior to the 
revocation. It allows for deprivation of nationality irrespective of whether or not the individual will 
ever commit an attack. 
C. DEPRIVATION OF NATIONALITY IN SELECTED COUNTRIES 
Having established the two different types of deprivation of nationality in counter-terrorism, an 
overview over their manifestations will now be provided to flesh out this theoretical background. 
Canada and the Netherlands will be discussed extensively below and have therefore been omitted 
from the overview. Its purpose is not to provide an in-depth survey or analysis of the legislative 
                                                 
21 This is the requirement adopted in the recently adopted Dutch Amendment, which will be scrutinized more closely 
in section IV of this paper; see also the recent Israeli amendment in this regard, Israel, Nationality (Amendment No. 
13) Law 5777 of 6 March 2017, s 11(b)(2)(b), see also The Law Library of the US Congress, “Israel: Amendment 
Authorizing Revocation of Israeli Nationality Passed” Library of Congress (23 March 2017) online: 
<http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/israel-amendment-authorizing-revocation-of-israeli-nationality-
passed/> for a comment on this. 
22 Israel, Nationality Law (Amendment No. 13) Law 5777 of 6 March 2017, s 11(b)2(c). 
23 Paradigm examples for this are s 40(2) BNA and s 34(1)c and (2)c ACA; see also M Goldstein, “Expatriation of 
Terrorists in the United Kingdom, United States, and France: Right or Wrong?” (2016) 25 Tul J Int'l & Comp L 259 
at 268-9; Wood (2015-2016) supra note 11 at 244-5. 
24 As nationals normally enjoy the right to remain within their country of nationality, as vested in Article 12(4) ICCPR. 




peculiarities of the eleven systems to be touched upon, but rather to provide examples of 
implementations of reactive and proactive deprivation of nationality in practice. It will also touch 
upon some grey areas, in particular laws that exhibit characteristics associated with both types of 
legislation. The selected laws will be discussed in order of their extensiveness, starting with South 
Africa as the country with the most far-reaching laws.  
(i) South Africa 
The South African provisions on deprivation of citizenship are a combination of the proactive sec. 
40(2) British Nationality Act (BNA) discussed below and the recently abolished reactive sec. 10(2) 
Canadian Citizenship Act (CCA).25 Adopting a dual approach, South African nationality can be 
revoked where the Minister of Home Affairs is ‘satisfied that it is in the public interest’.26 This 
resembles the approach taken by Great Britain, bringing with it the same critique. Section 8(2)(b) 
South African Citizenship Act (SACA) does not specify any other requirements that must be met, 
leaving the deprivation at the full discretion of the Minister. Additionally, South Africa also 
recognizes reactive denationalization under Section 8(2)(a) SACA, which grants the Minister the 
discretion to revoke the citizenship of an individual who has been sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment of at least twelve months in any country. Where the individual was convicted outside 
South Africa, it is additionally required that the offence committed would also have constituted an 
offence in South Africa. Interestingly, the application of Section 8(2)(a) is not restricted to terrorist 
offences but can be applied to any conviction, including low-level crimes such as theft or 
trespassing.27 Although more precisely and restrictively worded, Section 8(2)(a) might actually be 
even broader in its application than its proactive counterpart. Arguably, denationalizing an 
individual convicted of theft can hardly be justified in the public interest. Should the individual 
have been sentenced to at least a year of imprisonment, however, deprivation of nationality is still 
possible through Section 8(2)(a)). Consequently, South Africa has created a tight system of 
proactive and reactive denationalization. Deprivation of citizenship is possible in response to all 
but the pettiest offences and can also be deployed proactively long before a terrorist offence has 
reached the preparation stage. The application of the two types of revocation is, however, slightly 
                                                 
25 The relevant sections of the CCA are discussed in Section III of this paper. 
26 Section 8(2)(b) South African Citizenship Act 1995, no. 88 of 1995. 
27 As an example, an individual convicted of theft in Germany (§242 German Criminal Code, punishable with up to 
five years of imprisonment) could already be deprived of his South African citizenship. 
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curbed by section 8(2), which restricts the applicability of the two powers to dual-nationals.28 This 
ensures that deprivation of nationality does not lead to new cases of statelessness.  
(ii) The United Kingdom 
Any overview over deprivation of nationality would be incomplete if it were not to discuss the 
relevant section of the BNA 1981, which is notorious for the wide degree of discretion given to the 
minister. Section 40(2) of that Act states that denationalization is permitted where ‘that deprivation 
is conducive to the public good.’ This amendment, added in 2006,29 can arguably be categorized 
as proactive deprivation of nationality, although it can also be applied retroactively. Practically, 
there are hardly any limitations to the Secretary’s discretion to exercise this power. Following the 
insertion of section 40(4A) by the Immigration Act in 2014 the limitations have been reduced 
further.30 While originally an individual could not be deprived of his citizenship if statelessness 
were the consequences, this is now possible in a limited range of circumstances. Following the 
amendment, naturalized mono-nationals may now be denationalized if their conduct is ‘seriously 
prejudicial to the vital interests of [the UK]’ and the Home Secretary has reasonable grounds to 
believe that they can obtain another nationality. Not only does this section raise issues of 
discrimination by only being applicable to naturalized UK nationals, it also permits rendering 
foreign fighters stateless, at least temporarily. It does not require that another nationality be 
obtained before the deprivation takes effect, nor does the Home Secretary have to ensure that 
another nationality can actually be acquired. The seriousness of these deficiencies that actively 
undermine the global effort to end statelessness cannot be understated. In light of the vagueness of 
the UK’s laws on proactive deprivation, the great discretion that is given to the Minister, and the 
limited protection against statelessness, scholars have rightfully placed Britain at the forefront of 
states using denationalization as a counter-terrorist measure.31  
(iii) Australia 
Australian nationality law also contains a pendant to British approach.32 Interestingly, it also 
includes additional provisions that can be categorized as reactive deprivation of nationality, as 
                                                 
28 Section 8(2) SACA. 
29 Immigration, Asylum, and Nationality Act 2006. 
30 Immigration Act 2014, s 66(1); the power had been introduced in response to Secretary of State for Home Department 
v Al-Jedda [2013] UKSC 62, 9 October 2013, where deprivation of nationality had not been possible because it would 
have let to statelessness.  
31 Choudhury (2016) supra note 12 at 2-3; S Lavi, “Punishment and the Revocation of Citizenship in the United 
Kingdom, United States, and Israel”, (2010) 13 New Crim L Rev 404 at 410-411. 
32 Section 34(1)c, 34(2)c Australian Citizenship Act 2007 as amended, C2016C00726. 




citizenship may be revoked by ministerial decision where the individual has committed a serious 
offence,33 and provisions on the implied renunciation of citizenship by persons who commit one 
of the acts specified in Section 33AA (2) Australian Citizenship Act (ACA) 2007 where it is meant 
to further a political, religious, or ideological cause, to intimidate the public, or to coerce the 
government of a state or part therefor or influence it by intimidation.34 Renunciation under the latter 
provision takes effect automatically and immediately.35 The nature of Section 33AA ACA 2007 is 
less straightforwardly classifiable under the dualistic distinction outlined above, as it requires the 
engagement in an act that is at least supportive to terrorism,36 but neither refers to criminal law 
provisions nor requires a criminal conviction. Whether the provision can be classified as proactive 
or reactive therefore depends on the applicable type of conduct specified in Section 33AA(2)(a-h) 
ACA 2007: where the nationality is renounced as a consequence of e.g. ‘engaging in a terrorist 
act’37 it is reactive, whereas renunciation following the ‘receiving [of] training connected with 
preparation for, engagement in, or assistance in a terrorist act’38 can arguably be categorized as 
proactive. Consequently, Australian nationality law relies on a dual approach and uses both 
reactive and proactive deprivation of nationality.  
(iv) Switzerland 
Interestingly, Article 48 Swiss Citizenship Act corresponds to a large extend to Section 40(2) BNA. 
The provision allows for revocation of the ‘Schweizer Bürgerrecht’ if the conduct of the individual 
is seriously prejudicial to the interests or reputation of the state and the person in question holds at 
least one other nationality, thereby effectively preventing statelessness. Nationality can be revoked 
as soon as these cumulative criteria are met.39 The conduct requirement, arguably, is extremely 
vague and open to extensive interpretation, especially as despite the age of the provision, it has 
                                                 
33 Section 34(2)b(ii) ACA 2007 (note that this provision only applies to those to whom citizenship has been conferred). 
34 Section 33AA(1) jo. (2) ACA 2007; under subsection (3), it is assumed that the purpose requirement is met where 
the individual is a member of a terrorist organization or acting under the instructions thereof; the acts include engaging 
in international terrorist activities using explosive or lethal devices, engaging in a terrorist act, providing or receiving 
training connected with preparation for, engagement in, or assistance in a terrorist act, directing the activities of a 
terrorist organization, recruiting for a terrorist organization, financing terrorism, financing a terrorist, or engaging in 
foreign incursions and recruitment. 
35 Section 33AA(9) ACA 2007; see also Choudhury (2016) supra note 12 at 2. 
36 The conduct listed in section 33ACA(2) ranges from the engagement in international terrorist activities (a) to the 
financing of a terrorist (g). 
37 Section 33AA(2)(b) ACA 2007. 
38 Section 33AA(2)(c) ACA 2007. 
39 Article 48 Bürgerrechtsgesetz. 
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never been applied in practice.40 Given the absence of information on the application of the 
provision or the exact scope or severity of the conduct required to warrant denationalization, it 
could already be triggered by remote conduct not contributing to the commission of an attack yet. 
Limited guidance on this provision is provided by the handbook accompanying the law, which 
states that it is intended to apply primarily in the context of war, or to war criminals and terrorists.41 
As application to (returning) foreign fighters is neither explicitly intended nor prima facie 
restricted, it remains to be seen whether the law will be utilized in the fight against foreign fighters.  
(v) Austria 
Deprivation under Austrian Nationality law is similar to, but less extensive than, the English and 
Australian approach. Under §33(2) Austrian Citizenship Act, an individual voluntarily serving in 
an organized armed group and participating in armed hostilities abroad for that group, is to be 
deprived of his nationality.42 This is again an example of proactive deprivation of nationality, as (a 
conviction for the) commission of a terrorist attack within the country is not required to trigger the 
provision. On the one hand, actual participation in combat for the group is required, which clearly 
goes far beyond the ‘conducive in the public good standard’ adopted in England and requires proof 
that the prescribed conduct has actually been committed.43 On the other, §33(2) does not seem to 
leave room for discretion. Rather, the individual will lose his nationality by ministerial decision.44 
Interestingly, Austrian nationality law does not recognize reactive denationalization, neither 
through a specific provision nor through the infamous ‘public good’ standard adopted in England. 
Taking into account the ‘abroad’-requirement of §33(2), this creates a mechanism whereby an 
individual committing a terrorist crime in Austria cannot, whereas an individual fighting for a 
terrorist group abroad can, be expatriated. 
(vi) Israel 
Following an amendment passed in March 2017, Israel takes a proactive approach that differs from 
the one adopted by the United Kingdom or Australia. Under the new law, acquisition of citizenship 
of certain countries, or a right to residence in these countries, is deemed sufficient to establish a 
breach of allegiance, which subsequently allows for the revocation of nationality independent of 
                                                 
40 Staatssekretariat für Migration SEM, “Handbuch Bürgerrecht”, Eidgenössisches Justiz- und Polizeidepartement 
EJPD (27 September 2016) online: <https://www.sem.admin.ch/sem/de/home/publiservice/weisungen-
kreisschreiben/buergerrecht.html> Chapter 2 at 16. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Staatsbürgerschaftsgesetz 1985, BGBl. Nr. 311/1985. 
43 §33(2) StbG. 
44 §33(2) StbG clearly states that nationality ‘is to be revoked’ if the conditions specified therein are fulfilled. 




whether an actual threat is posed by the individual affected.45 In addition, actual residence in one 
of the countries will result in the presumption that a right to residence has been obtained.46 This 
dimension shows some similarities with its Austrian counterpart, as both allow for 
denationalization where the individual has left the country. On the one hand, while Austrian law 
requires that the individual has joined an organized armed group, residence in a specific country 
suffices for the revocation of Israeli nationality. On the other hand, the Israeli approach is more 
restricted in its scope of application, as the states it covers are explicitly enumerated and strictly 
limited.47 
(vii) United Arab Emirates 
Similarly to Belgium (see below), the UAE only deprives naturalized citizens of their nationality.48 
Natural born citizens cannot be expatriated for criminal offences committed.49 Under Article 16(1) 
UAE Nationality and Passport Act, the commission, or attempted commission, of any action 
‘deemed dangerous for the security or safety of the country’ can trigger denationalization. Although 
the Article applies to both attempts and commission regardless of a criminal conviction, it is less 
difficult to classify under the proactive-reactive categorization forwarded in the preceding section 
than it may seem at first sight. Regardless of whether the deprivation is triggered by commission 
or attempt, it is retroactive, as the threat posed has already materialized itself in the individual’s 
conduct and is no longer abstract. However, Article 16(1) does not provide a more detailed list, nor 
does it refer to specific criminal law provisions, to specify which conduct exactly warrants 
denationalization. The terminology of the provision can cover a wide range of actions and is open 
to extensive interpretation. Its application is not necessarily restricted to terrorist activities, but it 
could also be utilized against a wide range of political opponents. In light of the vagueness and 
broad applicability of the measure, deprivation of nationality becomes difficult to foresee.  
(viii) Belgium 
Belgian nationality can also be revoked reactively: under Article 23/2 Belgian Nationality Act an 
individual convicted of a terrorist offence as listed in Title I ter of the second book of the Belgian 
Criminal Code can be deprived of his nationality as a consequence thereof.50 Notably, this only 
                                                 
45 Nationality Law (Amendment No. 13) Law 5777 of 6 March 2017, s 11(b)2(c). 
46 Ibid. 
47 The provision includes Iran, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Libya, Syria, Sudan, Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen, and the Gaza Strip. 
48 Article 16 United Arab Emirates, Federal Law Concerning Nationality, Passports and Amendments thereof 
(Nationality and Passport Act), Federal Law no. 17 for 1972. 
49 Article 15 UAENPA. 
50 Strafwetboek 1867, 1867-06-08/01; Wetboek van de Belgische Nationaliteit 1984, 1984-06-28/35. 
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applies to individuals who have received Belgian Nationality by naturalization.51 Those who are 
Belgian by birth cannot be deprived of their nationality, regardless of whether or not they possess 
another nationality. Similar to its Australian counterpart, Article 23/2§1 allows for revocation on a 
wide array of grounds including preparatory offences, for as long as a punishment of at least five 
years of incarceration is imposed.52 At the time of writing, Belgian law does not include proactive 
deprivation of nationality.  
(ix) Malta 
Revocation under the Maltese Citizenship Act (MCA) can only have retroactive effect against 
naturalized Maltese Citizens.53 Under Section 14(2)(c), a naturalized Maltese Citizen may be 
deprived of his citizenship if he has been convicted of an offence and sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment of at least twelve months within seven years of becoming a citizen. This requirement 
shows similarities to Section 8(2)(a) South African Citizenship Act as it applies to convictions in 
any country. Furthermore, the nature of the crime is not specified, and revocation can thus respond 
to any conviction, even regarding petty offences. In contrast to the South African provision, 
however, the offence committed must not necessarily be recognized in Malta as well. In 
combination with the low sentencing requirement this might be problematic where the sentence 
has been imposed by a non-democratic regime. At the same time, the MCA includes a safeguard 
provision, that is the inverse of proactive denationalization under the BNA, ACA, or SACA. As 
revocation is only possible within seven years of obtaining Maltese citizenship, the provision can 
be described as creating a period of probation. Under Section 14(3) MCA, an individual may not 
be deprived of his nationality, unless the Minister54 is satisfied that the retention of nationality 
would not be conducive to the public good. This is the flipside of the UK approach, as the public 
good criterion is used as a safeguard against, rather than a ground for, deprivation of nationality. 
(x) The United States 
The United States is the first country in this brief overview in which denationalization is strongly 
restricted. In the U.S., the Government’s powers to revoke citizenship have been greatly restricted 
by the Supreme Court, which held revocation without consent of the individual by word or conduct 
to be unconstitutional.55 At the time of writing, the United States has not deprived  terrorists or 
                                                 
51 Article 23/2§1 WBN. 
52 Article 23/2§1 WBN jo. e.g. Article 140 SWB. 
53 Section 14(2)(c) Maltese Citizenship Act of 21 September 1964, cap. 188. 
54 As defined in Section 2(1) MCA. 
55 Lavi (2010), supra note 31 at 414-415; Goldstein (2016) supra note 23 at 276-277. 




individuals who support or join a terrorist organization of their citizenship.56 The standard adopted 
for renunciation of citizenship by conduct is notably high, as it requires the individual to perform 
one of the acts listed in Section 349 INA to ‘voluntarily’ perform those acts ‘with the intention of 
relinquishing US nationality.’57 Ultimately, only legislation drafted along the lines of Section 
33AA of the ACA 2007 could be adopted under U.S. law, as it establishes that a citizen performing 
certain acts renounces his or her citizenship. The currently proposed ETA would introduce such 
provisions, but it is highly questionable whether it will be passed by Congress.58 According to 
Spiro, it is doubtful whether engagement in hostilities against the U.S. in itself suffices to establish 
intent to relinquish.59 
(xi) Germany 
Germany provides the final, and together with the United States, the most restrictive example in 
this brief overview. Following the extensive abuse of denationalization by the NS-regime, 
revocation of nationality is now seriously restricted and apart from a few exceptions, prohibited by 
the German Basic Law: Article 16(1) GG prohibits the involuntary revocation of nationality by law 
or decision.60 The German state may under no circumstances withdraw the nationality held by one 
of its citizens, regardless of that individuals conduct. Reactive or proactive deprivation of 
nationality as recognized in the states discussed above, is therefore prohibited by the German Basic 
Law. However, German nationality can be lost under art. 16(1), even involuntarily, provided the 
loss is provided for by law and does not result in statelessness. In this context, the distinction 
between revocation and loss is pivotal. According to the BVerfG, the distinction is based on 
whether the revocation disregards the individual’s justified reliance on the continuance of his 
nationality.61 Justified reliance is absent, for example, where nationality has been fraudulently 
obtained.62 German nationality can also be lost through voluntary conduct of the individual, e.g. 
                                                 
56 United States, Expatriate Terrorist Act H.R. 1021 [introduced in House 13 February 2017], referred to the 
Subcommittee on Immigration and Border Security on 02 March 2017; Goldstein (2016), supra note 23 at 276-277, 
279-280. 
57 Section 349 United States, Immigration and Nationality Act 1952, Pub. L. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163; Wood (2015-2016) 
supra note 11 at 243; Goldstein (2016) supra note 23 at 276-277; see A Vasanthakumar, “Treason, Expatriation and 
'So-Called' Americans: Recovering the Role of Allegiance in Citizenship” (2014) 12 Geo J L & Pub Pol'y 187 at 213-
221 for a full discussion of the relevant US Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
58 Ibid at 279-280. 
59 PJ Spiro, “Expatriating Terrorists” (2014) 82 Fordham L Rev 2169 at 2176; Spiro refers to the case of Adam Gadahn, 
stating that shredding one’s passport can be deemed sufficient to show intent to relinquish. 
60 B Schmidt-Bleibtreu, H Hofmann, & A Hopfau eds, Kommentar zum Grundgesetz, 12th ed (Carl Heymanns Verlag, 
2011) at 543. 
61 Ibid, referring to Judgement of 24 May 2006, 2 BvR 669/04. 
62 Judgement of 24 May 2006, 2 BvR 669/04. 
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the acquisition of a foreign nationality or service in foreign armed forces.63 The latter is explicitly 
limited to other states. Joining a terrorist organization is thus not covered. In light of the 
constitutional prohibition, it seems unlikely that denationalization will be used as a counter-
terrorism tool any time soon. 
Despite the broad discretionary powers or automatic mechanisms that have been 
introduced, most of the above provisions include an essential common feature: from a purely 
legalistic perspective, all are only applicable to multi-nationals, ensuring that the revocation does 
not render a person stateless.64 This degree of protection seems to be the strongest in Germany, 
where the prevention of statelessness is a constitutional right. Regardless of criticism expressed 
towards denationalization and the worrisome vagueness of the majority of provisions introducing 
the deprivation of nationality as measure to counter terrorism, it must be acknowledged that a 
minimum degree of protection against statelessness is provided. Given detrimental consequences 
of statelessness for those affected, the importance of such protection must not be underestimated.65 
However, there is also a downside to this. Due to this limitation, these laws must primarily be 
applied to the largest communities of dual-nationals, which may in turn lead to indirect 
discrimination. For example, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights has raised 
serious concerns that the recent amendments to the DNA indirectly discriminate against ethnic 
Moroccans.66 The UAE Nationality and Passport and Section 40(4A) BNA contain worrying 
exceptions to the general effort to avoid statelessness, as these laws provide none or only limited 
safeguards to ensure new cases of statelessness are prevented. This is especially alarming since the 
provisions of the Act here discussed only apply to naturalized citizens, who must give up any other 
nationality they hold when obtaining UAE citizenship.67 Ergo, the measure is only applied to mono-
nationals, who become stateless as a consequence, unless they are able to have their original 
nationality restored. 
  
                                                 
63 §§25, 28 Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz, published 22 July 1913, as amended by Article 3 G v. 11.10.2016 I 2218. 
64 See section 40(4) BNA 1981; s 34(3)(b), 35(1)(c) ACA 2007; Article 14(8) DNA; s 10.4(1) CCA; Article 32/2§3 
WBN; §33(2) StbG; Article 16(1) GG; Article 48 BüG; s 8(2) SACA; s 14(3) MCA. 
65 The negative effects of statelessness are far-reaching, and individuals are often denied i.a. the enjoyment of legal protection, 
or are unable to own property or get married. For more a more elaborate list of the consequences of statelessness, see 
UNCHR, What would life be like if you had no Nationality?; and OW Vonk, MP Vink, & GR de Groot, “Protection against 
Statelessness: Trends and Regulations in Europe”, (2013) EUDO Citizenship Observatory at 11-12. 
66 CoE Commissioner for Human Rights, Letter to Dutch Ministers of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and Security 
and Justice, (2 November 2016), CommHR/NM/sf 045-2016 at 2. 
67 Article 11 UAENPA. 




Country Reactive Deprivation of Nationality Reactive Deprivation of Nationality 
SA Recognized, sec. 8(2)(a) SACA. Recognized, sec. 8(2)(b) SACA. 
Sentenced to 12 months of imprisonment 
for a recognized offence in any country. 
Minister is satisfied that revocation is in 
the public interest. 
UK Not recognized. Recognized, sec. 40(2) BNA. 
Minister is satisfied that revocation is 
conducive to the public good. 
AU Recognized, sec. 33AA ACA. Recognized, sec. 33AA ACA. 
Citizenship is implicitly renounced by 
acts specified in sec. 33AA(2)(a, b). 
Citizenship is implicitly renounced by 
acts specified in sec. 33AA(2)(c-h). 
Recognized, sec. 34(2)(b)(ii) ACA. Recognized, sec. 34(1)(c), (2)(c) ACA. 
Convicted of a serious offence: sentenced 
to death or a serious prison sentence 
before obtaining citizenship. 
Minister is satisfied that retention of 
citizenship is contrary to public interest. 
CH Not recognized. Recognized, art. 48 BüG. 
Conduct that is seriously prejudicial to 
the interests or reputation of the state. 
AT Not recognized. Recognized, §33(2) StbG. 
Service in, or participation in hostilities 
for, an organized armed group abroad. 
IL Not recognized. Recognized, sec. 11(b)2(c) Law 5777. 
Reception of the nationality of, or a right 
to residence in, certain Arab countries. 
BE Recognized, art. 23/2 WBN.68 Not recognized. 
Conviction for an offence under section 
Iter Book 2 of the Belgian Criminal Code. 
AE Recognized, art. 16(1) UAENPA.69 Not recognized. 
(Attempted) commission of any action 
deemed dangerous for the security or 
safety of the country 
MT Recognized, sec. 14(2)(c) MCA.70 Not recognized. 
Sentenced to 12 months of imprisonment 
for an offence in any country; retention 
must not be conducive to public good. 
US Declared unconstitutional by the USSC in Afroyim and Terrazas. 
Citizenship must be explicitly or implicitly relinquished by the citizen. 
DE Prohibited by constitution, art. 16(1) GG. 
Nationality cannot be revoked by the state unless fraudulently obtained. 
 
Table 1: Overview of expatriation in the selected countries discussed above71
                                                 
68 The measure applies only to naturalized Belgian citizens, see above. 
69 The measure applies only to naturalized UAE citizens, see above. 
70 The measure applies only to naturalized Maltese citizens, see above. 
71 As the holding of a second nationality is a prerequisite for denationalization in all countries discussed, but the UAE 
and the UK in part (see note on this above), it has been omitted from the overview. 
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III. DEPRIVATION OF NATIONALITY UNDER THE CANADIAN CITIZENSHIP ACT 
A. DEPRIVATION OF NATIONALITY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CANADIAN 
COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY 
Since 9/11, Canada has significantly increased its counter-terrorism efforts, particularly focusing 
on criminal and immigration law measures to address new threats.72 The counter-terrorism 
measures that were introduced by amendment to the Canadian Citizenship Act (CCA) in 2014 and 
subsequently removed again in 2017 must therefore be analyzed in the context of Canada’s counter-
terrorism policy, under which a wide range of measures have been adopted. The four-dimensional 
policy is based on the principles ‘prevent, detect, deny, respond’, and emphasizes that the highest 
priority is prevention, not only of actual terrorist offences, but also of the recruitment and training 
of new terrorist fighters.73  Its primary response to terrorism is criminal law. While this seems to 
be an effective approach, its implementation has been subject to criticism. Forcese remarks that 
many of the laws adopted to strengthen counter-terrorism capabilities are not related to the 2012 
policy and lack independent review for effectiveness. He points out that this will likely lead to the 
adoption of measures that seem to increase anti-terrorism efforts but are in fact ineffective and do 
not fit into the overall strategy.74 
Many far-reaching changes were introduced by the Anti-Terrorism Acts of 2001 and 2015 
and expanded the Country’s criminal law capacity to counter terrorism.75 At the time of writing, 
the Canadian Criminal Code (CCC) contains a specific chapter on terrorism as well as a number 
of additional provisions that together contain an excessive number of provisions criminalizing 
specific conduct, but also defines ordinary offences as terrorist crimes where they are committed 
in a specific context or for a certain purpose. These measures fall under the fourth fundamental 
principle of the Country’s counter-terrorism strategy: to prosecute terrorism as a criminal offence.76 
Following the Anti-Terrorism Act 2001, part II.1 of the Criminal Code now contains an elaborate 
but fragmented set of offences criminalizing different stages of terrorism offences. In light of this, 
                                                 
72 For a detailed overview over the development of Canadian anti-terrorism law see R Diab, “Canada”, in K Roach, 
ed, Comparative Counter-Terrorism Law, (CUP, 2015), at 78 et seq. and K Roach, The 9/11 effect: comparative 
counter-terrorism, (CUP 2011), at chapter 7. 
73 C Forcese and K Roach, False Security: The Radicalization of Canadian Anti-Terrorism, (Irwin Law Inc., 2015), at 
110-111.  
74 Ibid. 
75 While the extension of anti-terrorism legislation has seen a significant boost in Canada since 9/11, giving a 
comprehensive overview over all changes introduced since would exceed the scope of this paper.  For a discussion of 
these developments see Ibid particularly at 558 et seq.  
76 Government of Canada, Building Resilience against Terrorism: Canada’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 2d ed (2013) 
at 10. 




a comprehensive discussion of all relevant offences cannot possibly be conducted here. Rather, this 
section will focus on the provisions that address the foreign fighter threat and are of relevance to 
the discussion of proactive and reactive denationalization. As will be discussed more extensively 
in the Sections on the Netherlands, foreign fighters pose a particular challenge to criminal law 
centered approaches to terrorism. They can only be prosecuted for the offences that they commit 
while abroad, such as the joining of a terrorist organization, if the territorial scope of application 
of domestic criminal law has been extended accordingly. Furthermore, effective prosecution may 
be de facto impossible until the suspect has returned.    
Before turning to the most relevant sections of the Criminal Code in more detail, it should 
be noted that terrorism crimes have extra-territorial effect. With regard to the requirements that 
must be met for extra-territorial application, terrorist activities must be distinguished from specific 
terrorism offences. While the latter are explicitly enumerated in a number of specific provisions, 
terrorism activities include any act that is committed for ‘political, religious or ideological purpose, 
objective or cause’.77 An additional category covers offences related to the financing of terrorism 
activities.78 While those committing a terrorism offence can only be prosecuted if they hold 
Canadian citizenship or the right to permanent residence, terrorist activities are prosecutable as 
long as they are committed against Canadian citizens or the Government.79 In addition to these 
general offences, the CCC contains offences directed specifically at foreign fighters: under 
Sections 83.181 and 83.191 CCC, leaving the Country to facilitate, or participate in, the activities 
of a terrorist group or attempting to do so, is a separate criminal offence. The provisions cover any 
form of participation or facilitation. The Criminal Code also criminalizes leaving the country to 
commit any indictable offence for a terrorist organization.80 The Supreme Court has explicitly 
permitted extraterritorial law enforcement, provided that it complies with Canada’s obligations 
under international and human rights law.81  
The broad range of general and specific terrorism offences outlined above is supplemented 
by preventive detention. Under this highly controversial measure,82 terrorist suspects can be 
                                                 
77 Section 83.01(1)(b)(i)(A) Canadian Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46; for an elaborate discussion of the 
provisions see Diab, supra note 72, at 81 et seq. 
78 Section 83.02 CCC. 
79 Sections 3.74 and 3.75 CCC. The offence of financing terrorism also has extraterritorial affect under the conditions 
specified in Section 3.73 CCC. 
80 Specifically, this covers actions for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a terrorist group (Section 
83.201 CCC). 
81 Supreme Court of Canada, Canada (Prime Minister) v Khadr, 2010 SSC 3. 
82 Forcese and Roach, supra note 73, at 240. 
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detained on the basis of suspicions for up to three days without criminal charge. Individuals can be 
arrested by a peace officer without warrant on “reasonable grounds that the detention of the person 
in custody is likely to prevent a terrorist activity” since the adoption of the Anti-Terrorism Act 
2015.83 Furthermore, non-citizens can be detained indefinitely without warrant if they are 
“inadmissible and […] a danger to the public”.84 It can be effected on the basis of mere suspicion 
of association with a terrorist organization.85 Through security certificates, it is further possible to 
detain individuals pending their deportation if they are somehow associated with terrorism or pose 
a general threat to security in Canada, subject to review by a federal court.86 Appeal against this 
decision is only possible if the judge determines that a “serious question of general importance is 
involved”.87 The information on which the certificate is based is often classified and until the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Charkaoui were often not disclosed to the detainee.88 Following the 
ruling, the measure was amended to allow for the disclosure of the evidence to special advocates. 
Bill C-24, which will be discussed in the next section, was not officially a part of Canada’s 
counter-terrorism strategy but was nevertheless closely associated with it. After all, its proponents 
stressed the possibility of stripping convicted terrorists of their citizenship during the debate on the 
reversion of the amendment.89 It introduced deprivation of nationality as an extra-criminal law 
sanction and with it the deprivation of the right to return as guaranteed by Section 6 of the Charter. 
As a consequence, it de facto created the power to deport dual-nationals convicted of a terrorism 
offence. While the overall counter-terrorism strategy is centered around, and based primarily on, 
criminal law, denationalization supplemented this approach by providing additional forms of 
deterrence and punishment, as well as a means to prevent convicted terrorist from reoffending in 
Canada, thus contributing to the ‘prevent’ and ‘response’ dimensions.  
                                                 
83 Section 83.3(4)(b) CCC; for an extensive discussion of this power see Roach supra note 72 at 390 et seq. 
84 Section 55(2)(a) Canadian Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27. 
85 Diab supra note 72 at 97. 
86 Section 77.1 and 78 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. 
87 Section 79 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. 
88 Diab supra note 72 at 98-99; Supreme Court of Canada, Charkaoui v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration) 2007 SCC 9. 
89 Canada, House of Commons Debate of March 9 2016, House of Commons Debates, Vol. 148, No. 029, at 1651. 




B. BILL C-24: THE STRENGTHENING CANADIAN CITIZENSHIP ACT 
Under the pre-2014 Canadian Citizenship Act, revocation of nationality was only possible where 
citizenship had been obtained through fraud in the first place.90 As noted, many states revoke 
citizenship that has been granted erroneously. In Canada, the grounds for revocation of citizenship 
were expanded with the entering into force of the Strengthening of Canadian Citizenship Act on 
19 June 2014.91 Bill C-24 introduced wide changes to the entire CCA, but some of the most 
prominent can be found in the provisions on deprivation of nationality.92 The amendments 
introduced by clause 8 established eight new grounds for revocation, all centered around the 
commission of certain acts against Canada. These grounds were exceptionally broad and 
controversially had retroactive effect.93 For the purposes of this paper, Section 10(2)(b) CAA is 
especially relevant, even though it was ultimately repealed when Bill C-6 (discussed below) 
received royal assent on 19 June 2017. It will therefore be referred to as pre-2017 Section 10(2)(b) 
CCA. Nevertheless, it is important to discuss the Section to be able to compare the development of 
the use of nationality law under the Canadian Counter-terrorism strategy to the toughening of 
similar laws in the Netherlands. 
Pre-2017 Section 10(2)(b) CCA allowed for revocation on two different grounds, provided 
that a sentence of at least five years of imprisonment had been imposed for the offence in question: 
(1) the individual has been convicted of a terrorism offence as defined in Section 2 of the Canadian 
Criminal Code, which covers inter alia preparatory offences and offences of aiding and abetting; 
or (2) the individual has been convicted of an offence committed outside of Canada, that would be 
covered by the definition in Section 2 Canadian Criminal Code if it had been committed within 
Canada.94 The wording of the provision created a broad scope of applicability, particularly because 
it enabled retroactive application.95 It provided the Minister with a broad degree of discretion to 
deprive individuals of their nationality and remove them from the country.96 After all, the right to 
                                                 
90 See the Canadian Citizenship Act before the 19 June 2014 amendment; C Forcese, “A Tale of Two Citizenships: 
Citizenship Revocation for ‘Traitors and Terrorists’” (2013-2014) 39 Queen's LJ 551 at 566-567. 
91 Bill C-24, Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act, 2nd Sess, 41st Parl, 2014. 
92 Ibid at cl. 8; Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers, “Bill C-24, An Act to Amend the Citizenship Act and to 
Make Consequential Amendments to Other Acts” (2014) at 6. 
93 Canadian Bar Association, National Immigration Law Section, “Bill C-24, Strengthening Canadian Citizenship” 
(2014) at 4; Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers (2014) supra note 92 at 8; A Macklin, “Citizenship Revocation, 
the Privilege to Have Rights and the Production of the Alien” (2014) 40:1 Queen’s LJ at 25. 
94 Note that this specifically refers to terrorism offences and does consequently not include terrorist activity. 
95 Canadian Bar Association (2014) supra note 93 at 4-5; Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers (2014) supra note 
92 at 7; s 10(2) CCA. 
96 Section 10.3 CCA, this was the case before the amendment, when fraudulently obtained citizenship was revoked. 
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enter and remain in the country under Section 6 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (‘the 
Charter’) only applies to Canadian citizens. After denationalization, the individual becomes a 
foreign national rather than a permanent resident and consequently has no right to remain in Canada 
but can be deported.  
Nevertheless, some limitations on the power to revoke nationality had been put in place. 
Clause 8 of Bill C-24 introduced safeguards to ensure that the newly introduced measures did not 
render individuals stateless.97 The restrictions included in Section 10.4(1) ensured that revocation 
on the grounds including Section 10(2)(b) did not violate ‘any international human rights 
instrument regarding statelessness […].’ The strictness of this limitation was however mitigated by 
the subsequent subsection. An individual who is to be denationalized but claims to fall within the 
ambit of section 10.4(1) will have to prove on a balance of probabilities that he is not a citizen of 
another country if the minister has reasonable grounds to believe that he is. In short, the onus of 
proof could thus easily be shifted onto the individual who then had to disprove the assumption that 
he or she held another country’s citizenship.98 The minister, on the other hand, was able to base the 
revocation on the presumption, rather than the certainty, that the individual had claim to another 
country’s citizenship.99 
C. CRITIQUE 
The brief description of the amendments introduced by the Strengthening Canadian Citizenship 
Act has already hinted at some of the issues inherent in Bill C-24. Indeed, it was widely criticized 
by different NGOs and associations. However, before their objections can be discussed, it is 
necessary to briefly consider the issues raised by the adoption of the Bill in and of itself. After all, 
it is not entirely clear what the objectives of the Bill were and how it fit into Canada’s overall 
counter-terrorism strategy. According to the statements made by the Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration during the discussion of Bill C-24, the measure was based on the perception that it 
had become common practice in all other NATO states to denationalize disloyal citizens.100 This 
                                                 
97 Section 10 CCA. 
98 Section 10.4(2) CCA; Canadian Library of Parliament, An Act to amend the Citizenship Act and to make 
consequential amendments to other Acts, Publication No. 41-2-C24-E (2014) at 16-17; Canadian Association of 
Refugee Lawyers (2014), supra note 92 at 8; Forcese (2013-2014) supra note 90 at 569. 
99 Canadian Bar Association (2014) supra note 93 at 3; Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers (2014) supra note 
92 at 8. 
100 Canada, House of Commons Debate of June 12 2014, House of Commons Debates, Vol. 147, No. 102 at 6742, 
stating that all NATO states but Portugal allow for denationalization.  




reasoning is not only weak, but also obviously flawed. The fact that other states adopt certain 
measures does not necessarily guarantee the effectiveness of a measure nor show the need for it in 
a specific country. Additionally, as has been shown in the survey in Section 2 of this paper, 
Germany and the United States both strictly oppose depriving their nationals of their citizenship, 
even where they have openly turned against the state. In light of this, it seems that the main purpose 
of the amendment was to reflect the value of Canadian citizenship, strengthening it through 
denationalization in cases of serious disloyalty or breaches of allegiance, such as the commission 
of a terrorism offence.101 The introduction of this quasi-criminal law sanctioning mechanism seems 
to have been the primary aim of the amendment, which was reiterated in the debates surrounding 
the abolition of the measure.102 While this may be a valid reason, it does not fit the approach set 
out by the 2012 strategy. After all, the strategy advocates the use of criminal law, not quasi-criminal 
law sanctioning under administrative law, as the main tool to ‘respond’ to terrorist conduct. Worse 
still, pre-2017 Section 10(2)(b) weakened Canadian and global counter-terrorism efforts in general. 
By denationalizing individuals and deporting them to the country of second nationality, the 
measure risked that these individuals would commit terrorist offences abroad for which they could 
not then be prosecuted in Canada. This would effectively have relocated the threat to another 
country rather than addressed it for good. This issue has also been raised by the NGOs criticizing 
the measure and will be addressed in the next section. The issue is nevertheless remedied to a 
certain extend by the fact that the requirements for the extra-territorial application of Canadian 
criminal law to terrorist activities differ from those required to prosecute a terrorism offence 
committed abroad, as in the former case it suffices that the activity was directed against a 
governmental facility or the Canadian Government.103  
Returning to the issue of exporting the terrorist threat, a point of critique that is generally 
applicable to all types of deprivation of nationality, the issue that denationalization does not resolve 
the terrorist threat in and of itself will be addressed.104 Although the revoking state is, at least in 
theory, no longer threatened by the individual within its own territory, the threat itself has not been 
resolved. As denationalization is only possible where the individual possesses another nationality, 
the country of the remaining citizenship will be forced to take in the individual, and with him the 
                                                 
101 Ibid. 
102 House of Commons Debate of March 9 2016 supra note 89 at 1647 et seq. 
103 Section 7(3.35) CCC. 
104 Canadian Library of Parliament (2014) supra note 98 at 25; Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers (2014), 
supra note 92 at 9. 
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threat of an attack. Should a sufficient number of states adopt legislation of either type, this could 
lead to a race for revocation105 and potentially result in a viscous circle in which states adopt ever 
broader revocation provisions to be able to denationalize citizens before another state does so.106 
Another set of problems inherent in Canada’s pre-2017 legislation was that Section 10 
practically introduced a form of retroactive banishment limited to dual-nationals. This raised 
several points of criticism at once. First, the fact that the punishment of banishment was 
reintroduced.107 Even though the bill does not (re-)introduce banishment as a criminal law sanction, 
the effects of the revocation were comparable. A more pressing, second, point is that the 
denationalization could also have been used to prevent potential future offences. On the sole basis 
of past conduct, individuals could have been denationalized to prevent them from reoffending. 
Although numerous criminal law systems impose punishment for aiding, abetting, or preparatory 
acts, the revocation was a purely administrative measure and not subject to the rules and standards 
of protection of criminal procedure. Critics argued that future conduct should be addressed through 
criminal law rather than administrative measures.108 Punishment should be imposed as a response 
to conduct prohibited by criminal law and not through quasi-criminal law administrative measures, 
especially not where they only seek to prevent distant harm that may never materialize. A final 
point of critique that was raised in this regard addressed the dilemma of the measure only being 
applicable to dual-nationals. On the one hand, the measure cannot apply to mono-nationals, as this 
could render individuals stateless. However, including protection against statelessness while 
maintaining the measure will necessarily place dual-citizens in a less favorable position than mono-
nationals.109 It raised the serious issue of direct discrimination against dual-nationals110 and had the 
potential to fuel stereotypes against certain parts of the population in which dual-nationality is 
                                                 
105 Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers (2014) supra note 92 at 9. 
106 This is a general issue inherent in denationalizing (suspected) terrorists, compare GR De Groot, Towards a Toolbox 
for Nationality Legislation (Maastricht: Nexus Legal, 2016) at 32; and S Jayaraman, “International Terrorism and 
Statelessness: Revoking the Citizenship of ISIL Foreign Fighters” (2016) 17 Chi J Int'l L 178 at 203; the extension of 
the Home Secretaries powers under the BNA through s 66(1) Immigration Act 2014 (see Section II) could be seen as 
an indication of this, as it was adopted specifically as a response to the impossibility of denationalizing a naturalized 
mono-national.  
107 Canadian Bar Association (2014) supra note 93 at 3-4; Amnesty International Canada, “Bill C-24: Amnesty 
International’s concerns regarding proposed changes to the Canadian Citizenship Act” (2014) at 4; Canadian 
Association of Refugee Lawyers (2014) supra note 92 at 8. 
108 Canadian Library of Parliament (2014) supra note 98 at 25. 
109 Canadian Bar Association (2014) supra note 93 at 4. 
110 Amnesty International Canada (2014) supra note 107 at 2-3. 




especially common. Bill C-24 was heavily criticized for being discriminatory, creating two classes 
of citizens, and placing certain groups of Canadians under general suspicion.111 
The criticism raised against Bill C-24 does not end here, however. In addition to the issues 
outlined above, the possibility if depriving individuals of their citizenship where they had been 
convicted for certain offences abroad was also subject to critique. It highlighted the serious issues 
that would arise where the conviction had occurred in a country that does not adhere to due process 
and fair trial standards, or deliberately persecutes those opposing the local government for terrorism 
offences.112 Another, final point of criticism was raised by UNICEF, which found that the 
legislation may have severe, two-fold impact on children and juveniles. First, it was remarked that 
Section 10(2) contained no restrictions regarding the age of those who could be denationalized.113 
While this issue was slightly mitigated by the requirement of a criminal conviction and the fact that 
Canadian criminal law only assigns responsibility to those above the age of 12, the issue 
nevertheless continues to exist for juveniles above that age.114 Secondly, children whose parents 
have their nationality revoked, will be either be forced to leave the country, or separated from their 
families.115 
Next to the shortcomings of pre-2017 Section 10(2)(b), the safeguards against statelessness 
included in Section 10.4 were also flawed. Although the provision prohibits the revocation where 
it would result in statelessness, it also places the onus on the individual, who will have to disprove 
the minister’s initial findings that the individual will be able to obtain another nationality. This shift 
contravenes the UNHCR’s findings that possession of a second nationality must always be 
demonstrated by the party advancing the claim, here the Minister.116 Additionally, the construction 
is disadvantageous to the individual, as the minister will have significantly better resources to 
establish whether a second nationality could be obtained.  
In summary, the rationale behind the introduction of the measure as well as its quality were 
highly questionable. It is unclear why, taking into account the serious concerns and problems 
outlined in the preceding paragraphs, there was need for an additional administrative sanction for 
                                                 
111 Canadian Bar Association (2014) supra note 93 at 4; Amnesty International Canada (2014) supra note 107 at 2-3. 
112 Amnesty International Canada (2014) supra note 107 at 6. 
113 UNICEF Canada, “Bill C-24: The Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act - Brief submitted by UNICEF Canada 
to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration” (2014) at 10. 
114 Section 13 Canadian Criminal Code. 
115 UNICEF supra note 113. 
116 UNHCR, Interpreting the 1961 Statelessness Convention and Avoiding Statelessness resulting from Loss and 
Deprivation of Nationality – Summary Conclusions (2013). 
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those who have already been convicted of a terrorist offence in Canada, especially when 
considering the broad scope of the relevant criminal law provisions and the general focus of 
Canada’s anti-terrorism strategy.117  
D. BILL C-6: REVERTING THE CHANGES INTRODUCED BY BILL C-24 
Following the Canadian elections in the fall of 2015, the new liberal government introduced Bill 
C-6 on 25 February 2016.118 The amendment was adopted by the Canadian House of Commons 
and passed by the Canadian Senate with amendments on 3 May 2017. It received Royal Assent on 
19 June and subsequently entered into force.119 The amendment reverts many of the changes 
introduced by the 2014 amendment. For the scope of this paper, clauses 3 and 5 on deprivation of 
citizenship are particularly relevant. Bill C-6 made short work of the expatriation sections 
previously included in the CCA. Clause 3 simply repealed Section 10(2) altogether, thereby 
removing the possibility of denationalizing those convicted of terrorism offences. Section 10.4, 
which provided insufficient and unfair protection against statelessness was abolished by clause 5 
of the Bill C-6. In short and with regards to deprivation of citizenship, the CCA was reverted to its 
pre-2014 status, making fraud the only ground on which citizenship may be revoked.120 The new 
amendment has been welcomed widely for its reversion of Bill C-24: by limiting revocation to 
instances where citizenship has been obtained by fraud, the broad and heavily criticized grounds 
for revocation in the pre-2017 Section 10(2)(b) have been removed.121 The reform has been praised 
for reintroducing equality in citizenship by no longer subjecting dual- and mono-nationals to 
                                                 
117 See i.a. s 2 jo. 83.02-04 and 83.18-23 Canadian Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46. 
118 Parliament of Canada, LEGISinfo on Bill C-6, online: 
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/LegisInfo/BillDetails.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&billId=8117654&View=0>; Levitz, S., 
“Liberals to Pull back Tory Citizenship Rules – Terrorism to No Longer Be Grounds for Revoking Citizenship” 
National Post (25 February 2016) online: <http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/liberals-to-pull-back-tory-
citizenship-rules-restoring-citizenship-terrorism>. 
119 Parliament of Canada, LEGISinfo on Bill C-6, online: 
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/LegisInfo/BillDetails.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&billId=8117654&View=0>. 
120 Canadian Library of Parliament, An Act to amend the Citizenship Act and to make consequential amendments to 
another Act, Publication No. 42-1-C6-E (2016) at 4. 
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different standards, and removing the ‘two tiers’ of citizenship122 and for removing 
denationalization as a form of punishment outside the realm of criminal law.123 
IV. DEPRIVATION OF NATIONALITY UNDER THE DUTCH NATIONALITY ACT 
On 10 March 2016, the Netherlands amended the Dutch Nationality Act (DNA)124 to widen the 
possibility of revoking nationality of those convicted of preparatory terrorist offences, similar to 
Bill C-24.125 In addition to the 2016 amendment, the Netherlands adopted further reaching 
legislation in 2017. The Act amending the DNA in relation to the revocation of nationality in the 
interest of national security has been published in the official journal on 22 February 2017126 and 
entered into force on 1 March 2017, introducing proactive denationalization.127 Both Acts have 
been adopted in the context of the 2014 action plan for an integral approach to jihadism,128 which 
seeks to reduce the threats originating from jihadists by all means.129 Both amendments find their 
policy basis in the fourth measure announced in the first section of the plan, which clearly stipulates 
that Dutch nationality will be used as a means in the fight against terrorism, by making it revocable 
with and without a previous conviction for a terrorist offence.130 The new measures are particularly 
serious, as Dutch nationality that has been revoked under either of the two provisions cannot be 
reinstated.131 Deviation from this rule is only possible under exceptional circumstances provided 
that at least five years have passed since the denationalization.132  
In discussing these legal developments in depth, the subsequent sections will first elaborate 
on the counter-terrorism context within which these laws operate, following which the 2016 and 
2017 amendments will be analyzed and classified according to the two types established above., 
before highlighting the problems inherent in the new legislation. 
                                                 
122 Canadian Council for Refugees, “Bill C-6: An Act to Amend the Citizenship Act and to Make Consequential 
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123 Canadian Council for Refugees (2016) supra note 122 at 6. 
124 Rijkswet op het Nederlanderschap (Dutch Nationality Act), BWBR0003738. 
125 Rijkswet van 5 maart 2016 supra note 8; now incorporated in Article 14(2) DNA. 
126 Rijkswet van 10 februari 2017 supra note 10; now incorporated as article 14(4) in the DNA. 
127 Article II of Besluit van 10 februari 2017 supra note 10. 
128 Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice, national Coordinator Counter-terrorism and Security, and Minister of Social 
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129 Ibid at 4-8. 
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A.  DEPRIVATION OF NATIONALITY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE DUTCH COUNTER-
TERRORISM STRATEGY 
Before discussing the counter-terrorism measures recently inserted into the Dutch Nationality Act 
to respond to the foreign fighter threat, it is necessary to discuss the range of other counter-terrorism 
measures that have been enacted as part of the Country’s anti-terrorism strategy. While the primary 
response of Dutch law is also centered around penal law, several non-criminal law measures have 
also been adopted to prevent radicalization and de-radicalize foreign fighters who have returned to 
the Netherlands. Under the name Exits, a facility intended to de-radicalize and re-socialize 
extremists was created in 2015. It is directed at specific groups of radicalized individuals who 
reside in the Netherlands. However, it does not extend to Dutch foreign fighters who succeeded in 
leaving the Country and have not (yet) returned.133 The facility’s task is to support individuals who 
voluntarily want to leave jihadism behind. Continuing to resemble a carrot-and-stick approach to 
terrorism and foreign fighters in particular, the Dutch counter-terrorism strategy includes other 
non-criminal law measures, such as blocking the financial means and support of foreign fighters 
whilst simultaneously offering consular assistance to foreign fighters abroad who want to leave the 
organization they had joined.134 This is a first indication of the bipartite approach that the 
Netherlands have adopted: tackling the terrorist threat at home through criminal and non-criminal 
law measures, while simultaneously striving to prevent radical foreign fighters from returning 
home and continuing their fight within the Country. 
As mentioned, the Dutch approach includes a strong criminal law framework to address the 
foreign fighter problem as such, as well as the threats that are posed by their return. Given the great 
range of offences that are potentially applicable, it must suffice to mention a few notable and 
particularly relevant examples here. Under Article 83 Dutch Criminal Code (DCC) an extensive 
list of ordinary crimes is deemed a terrorism offence where it is committed with the intention to 
further a terrorist aim.135 Furthermore, specific terrorism offences such as joining a terrorist 
                                                 
133 Specifically, Exits is directed at active jihadists without the intention to leave the Netherlands, radicalized 
individuals with the intention to leave the country to become foreign fighters, returning foreign fighters, those 
suspected or convicted of a terrorist offence and detained in special terrorist sectors of a penitentiary, see The 
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135 The wide range of offences includes murder (Article 289 DCC), obstructing a session of either chamber of 
parliament by force or threat (Article 121 DCC), or the unlicensed acquisition of firearms or ammunition (Article 55(5) 
jo. 9 Dutch Weapons and Ammunition Law). 




organization have been included136 and the preparation of any offence subject to a term of 
imprisonment of at least eight years is in itself a criminal offence.137 In addition to this general 
doctrine of preparation, Article 134a DCC criminalizes a number of specific preparatory terrorism 
offences. In addressing terrorism, Dutch criminal law emphasizes prevention by criminalizing 
conduct that takes place before the commission can be attempted or completed. Importantly, these 
offences have extraterritorial effect.138 Dutch nationals who commit a terrorism offence outside the 
territory of the Netherlands will still be subject to Dutch criminal law and prosecuted accordingly.  
However, the measures listed above were deemed insufficient and incapable of targeting 
foreign fighters abroad in particular, despite the extensive territorial scope. In the parliamentary 
debate on the 2017 amendment, the government highlighted the factual impossibility of applying 
the above measures to foreign fighters before their return to the Netherlands. While Dutch criminal 
law does not suffer from material shortcomings in this regard and is de jure applicable to foreign 
fighters, the government has stressed that effective prosecution is de facto impossible.139 The 
prosecution of an individual who has committed one of the offences outlined above is seriously 
obstructed as arresting and detaining the individual is nearly impossible before the return. But 
according to the Government, the return is exactly what must be prevented at all cost in light of the 
serious threat posed by these individuals. In light of this approach, prosecution of terrorism 
offences committed abroad is indeed not a viable option. Instead, foreign fighters are to be 
denationalized whilst still abroad and declared persona non grata to prevent them from returning 
to the Netherlands altogether.140 Nevertheless, it seems that criminal law has not entirely been 
rejected in this context.  In November 2016, an amendment to the DCC was discussed that sought 
to criminalize the intentional presence in regions controlled by a terrorist organization without the 
prior approval of the Minister of Security and Justice.141 Due to severe criticism from advisory 
bodies and the Council of State, the proposal was not included in the amendment introduced into 
                                                 
136 Article 140a DCC. 
137 Article 46 DCC. 
138 Article 4 Besluit van 28 januari 2014, internationale verplichtingen extraterritoriale rechtsmacht (decision on 
international obligation of extraterritorial jurisdiction), BWBR0034775. 
139 Bill 34356, nr. 6 supra at note 133, 7. 
140 Ibid at 5.  
141 C Pelgrim, ‘Kabinet: verblijf op terroristisch grondgebied wordt toch niet strafbaar’, NRC (27 June 2017), online: 
<https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2016/11/18/van-der-steur-wil-verblijf-in-is-gebied-strafbaar-stellen-5344532-
a1532477>.  
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parliament in June 2017.142 Particularly, the Associations of Dutch Journalist and Judges had taken 
serious issue with the proposed amendment.143  
In line with the discussion of the Canadian approach, it should lastly be noted that Dutch 
authorities hold the power to take those suspected of one of these terrorist offences into remand on 
the basis of a judicial order thereto.144 This is not an equivalent to preventive detention under 
Canadian law, however; reasonable grounds to believe that a terrorism offence will be prevented 
do not suffice to detain an individual. The power to detain aliens is also greatly restricted in Dutch 
law. While detention on grounds of national security is possible, its application is explicitly 
restricted to cases where no less intrusive means are available and until the individual agrees to 
deportation.145 The length of detention is also strictly limited and may usually not extend beyond 
six months.146 
In summary, the Netherlands have adopted a counter-terrorism strategy that addresses two 
different types of threats very differently. On the one hand, criminal law measures and 
rehabilitation efforts such as Exits address the internal terrorist threat posed by individuals who 
reside within the country or have returned to the country. Criminal prosecution is possible long 
before a concrete threat materializes, and individuals are supported in their efforts to leave jihadism 
behind. On the other hand, the country adopts a strong stance against foreign fighters based on the 
underlying premise that once an individual has succeeded in leaving the Netherlands to join a 
terrorist organization, despite the strong internal efforts to prevent this, their return must be 
prevented at all cost. The counter-terrorism measures under nationality law, that will be discussed 
below, are thus not the only means that have been adopted to address the foreign fighter threat. 
Rather, they are meant to fit into the existing approach and fill the gaps that have been identified 
therein, particularly the risks posed by foreign fighters who intend to return from fighting abroad 
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and the lack of effectiveness in the enforcement of criminal law extraterritorially. They contribute 
to the second dimension of the Dutch anti-terrorism strategy in particular. 
B. THE 2016 AMENDMENT: DENATIONALISING THOSE CONVICTED UNDER 
ARTICLE 134(A) DUTCH CRIMINAL CODE 
The most important change introduced by the 2016 amendment is the addition of Article 134a 
Dutch Criminal Code to the grounds upon which nationality can be revoked under Article 14(2)(b) 
DNA: the Minister of Justice and Security is granted the discretion to revoke the nationality of an 
individual after that person has been convicted of an offence under 134a DCC.147 This provision 
criminalizes inter alia the factual acquisition of, or mere intention to acquire, means for the 
commission of a terrorist attack or the preparation of such an attack.148 The 2016 amendment is 
clearly a measure of reactive revocation. In contrast to its Canadian counterpart, the amendment 
itself does not introduce deprivation in response to a conviction for a terrorism offence, but rather 
widens the range of offence that can trigger denationalization. While many terrorism offences had 
already been included in Article 14(2)(b) DNA through Article 83 DCC since an amendment in 
2010,149 the 2016 amendment extended the scope significantly by adding Article 134a DCC as a 
ground for deprivation. The provision criminalizes the acquisition of information, means, or skills 
for the purpose of committing a terrorist offence, as well as the attempt to do so. The scope of 
denationalization is thereby extended to include a wide range of preparatory conduct, whereby its 
preventive capabilities are significantly strengthened. This fits into the generally preventive 
approach that is also reflected in Dutch criminal law as discussed briefly above. In summary, the 
amendment enables the Minister to deprive a multi-national irreversibly convicted under one of the 
provisions enumerated in Article 14(2), a decision that is to be based on the individuals’ 
circumstances and the threat they pose. Because the denationalization must be based on a 
conviction, it is to some extend subject to indirect review by the courts who have to determine the 
terrorist nature of the underlying offence. The application of Article 14(2) DNA is subject to 
limitations that are similar to those of the pre-2017 Section 10(2)(b) CCA, although the standards 
of protection differ. Under Article 14(8) DNA, only multi-nationals can be deprived of their 
nationality, as denationalizing mono-nationals would render them stateless. In accordance with 
international law, this limitation does not apply where nationality is revoked that had been 
                                                 
147 See also HU Jessurun D’Oliveira, “Intrekking Nederlanderschap bij terrorisme” (2016) NJB 2016/725. 
148 Article 134a Wetboek van Strafrecht, BWBR0001854. 
149 M Klaus, “De bestuurlijke aanpak van terrorisme bezien vanuit het non-discriminatiebeginsel”, (2017) SecJure. 
52 THE TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS REVIEW                                                [VOL 5] 
 
fraudulently acquired in the first place.150 However, the onus of proof is different from that under 
the CCA. It is not for the person who is to be denationalized to prove that he would become 
stateless; revocation is simply prohibited if it results in statelessness. 
The 2016 amendment and the powers that it extends addresses the threat posed by those 
who participate in terrorist training camps or attempt to do so.151 While the Netherlands had long 
recognized the power to deprive individuals who had joined another states’ armed forces of their 
nationality, this power does not extend to the forces of non-state actors.152 This lacuna was closed 
by the 2016 amendment, as the grounds for denationalization now include convictions for 
participating in training camps. It is aimed at the threat posed by IS and the foreign fighters that 
join it in particular.153 In addition, the amendment communicates that the use of Dutch citizenship 
to facilitate terrorism in any state is not acceptable, thereby also stressing the values that are 
attributed to Dutch citizenship.154  
While content and purpose of reactive deprivation under Dutch law are rather 
straightforward, it must be acknowledged that the practical effectiveness of the measure may be 
reduced in certain individual cases following the CJEU’s rulings in Ruiz Zambrano155 and CS. 156 
In the former case, a Columbian national challenged the refusal of the Belgian authorities to grant 
him a working permit, as this would force him to leave the Union altogether, taking his two children 
with Belgian nationality with him.157 The CJEU held that member states are not allowed to adopt 
measures depriving EU citizens of their fundamental rights under EU law.158 By leaving the EU 
altogether, the children would have been unable to exercise e.g. their free movement rights, which 
under the Ruiz Zambrano rule is unacceptable.159 Although this rule was originally unqualified, 
                                                 
150  As permitted under article 8(2)(b) Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 30 August 1961, 989 UNTS 175 
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154 Ibid at 2. 
155 Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi (ONEm), CJEU, Case C-34/09. 
156 Secretary of State for the Home Department v CS, CJEU, Case 304/14. 
157 GR De Groot and NC Luk, “Twenty Years of CJEU Jurisprudence on Citizenship” (2014) 15 German LJ 821 at 
829. 
158 Ruiz Zambrano, supra note 155. 
159 It must be underlined in this context that the Court did not create an autonomous, but only a derivative right for 
third-country nationals, as reiterated i.a. in Ymeraga et. al. v Ministre du Travail, de l’Emploi et de l’Immigration, 
CJEU, Case C-87/12. 




this has changed since CJEU’s ruling in CS v UK, where the Court, for the first time, established 
limitations on the derived right. According to the CJEU, a derived right of residence may be denied 
only the grounds of public policy and security as defined under EU law,160 and requires an 
individual assessment of the case, meaning that it may not be the automatic consequence of e.g. a 
conviction.161 Following these rulings, EU law can curb the effectiveness of the 2016 amendment: 
should the denationalized individual have a relative, a child for example, who is an EU national 
and dependent on him, he may nevertheless enjoy a derived right of residence. Should the threat 
posed by the individual be insufficiently serious to trigger the CS exception, the denationalization 
would de facto be rendered meaningless.162 Thus, EU law imposes at least light restrictions on the 
effectiveness of the 2016 amendment. The exact impact and scope of this limitation will however 
remain unclear until the first cases on this matter are brought before the Dutch courts or the CJEU. 
Nevertheless, should it ever prevent the expulsion of a convicted and denationalized terrorist, this 
would be a significant blow to the overall effectiveness of the 2016 amendment. 
Following the enactment of the 2016 amendment, Dutch and Canadian laws on deprivation 
of nationality as a counter-terrorism means had become akin. Both allowed for reactive 
denationalization on a similar set of grounds and had strong preventive notions. Neither required 
the commission of an actual terrorist attack to be triggered, as the commission of preparatory 
offences sufficed. The two approaches branched with the adoption of Bill C-6 and the 2017 
amendment, which will now be discussed.  
C. THE 2017 AMENDMENT: DENATIONALISING THOSE WHO JOIN A TERRORIST 
ORGANISATION 
Less than a year after the 2016 amendment had entered into force, the second amendment to the 
DNA announced by the action plan became law.163 It had been submitted to the lower chamber of 
the Dutch Parliament on 4 December 2015,164 and was ultimately adopted by the upper chamber 
on 7 February 2017.165 As suggested by the name of the amendment, the Act allows for the 
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165 Stemming Intrekken Nederlanderschap 7 February 2017, Eerste Kamer Handelingen 2016-2017, nr. 17 reprinted, 
item 4. 
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revocation of nationality in the ‘interest of national security’. The amendment was deemed a 
necessary response to the ineffectiveness and undesirability of extraterritorial enforcement of 
Dutch criminal law against foreign fighters in particular. It addresses a lacuna in the Dutch counter-
terrorism policy, particularly with regard to foreign fighters who have succeeded in leaving the 
country and not yet returned to the Netherlands. While the individuals could certainly be convicted 
in absentia, the sentence could not be executed.166 This creates a lacuna, as the threat posed by 
foreign fighters upon their return cannot be effectively addressed pre-emptively under the pre-
amendment framework. Under the bipartite approach discussed above, the Netherlands is first and 
foremost determined to prevent or hinder foreign fighters from returning to their home country due 
to the extreme risk they are said to pose.167  
The 2017 amendment seeks to close this gap in the pre-emptive efforts against foreign 
fighters through nationality law. The Dutch minister of Justice and Security is granted the broad 
discretionary power to revoke the nationality of individuals residing outside the Netherlands if their 
conduct indicates that they have joined an organization listed as engaging in an internal or 
international armed conflict and endangering national security.168 Whether the individual has 
joined such an organization is established where:169 (1) based on the conduct of the individual, it 
can be established beyond reasonable doubt that the individual supports the aims of the 
organization and intends to join it, or (2) the individual carries out actions for, or to the benefit of, 
the organization.  
Together with their nationality, the individuals are also deprived of their right to return and 
declared persona non grata to prevent their lawful return to the Netherlands. Although this does 
not provide absolute protection against factual return, it is said to seriously obstruct it. The scope 
of application of the measure is limited to dual-nationals under Article 14(8) DNA to prevent new 
cases of stateless. In practice, the deprivation of Dutch nationality has been disconnected from 
criminal law and is now possible before an attack or any other terrorism offence has been 
committed, prepared, or even planned. Joining a terrorist organization under the above criteria in 
and of itself warrants denationalization at the discretion of the minister. Thus, as of 1 March 2017, 
the Netherlands also employs proactive deprivation of nationality as a counter-terrorism tool. The 
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newly created power was first used in September 2017, when the Dutch Minister of Justice and 
Security deprived four Dutch dual-nationals of their citizenship for the first time.170 At the time of 
writing, cases that challenge the new law or a decision thereunder have not been reported. It 
remains to be seen whether individuals who have been deprived of their nationality will challenge 
the underlying decision in court. In light of the recent case of K2 v UK it seems highly likely that 
this will be the case, however.171 In this case, a decision of the British Home Secretary depriving a 
British dual national of his citizenship and forcing him to return to Sudan was challenged from 
abroad. This shows that even deportation or residence abroad is not necessarily an obstacle to 
challenging these decisions. In light of the British case, it seems to be only a question of time until 
cases against a decision adopted under Article 14(4) DNA will be brought.172 
Despite its purely proactive and very broad scope, the new Article 14(4) DNA is not free 
from restrictions. As stated, it cannot be applied to mono-nationals as this would render them 
stateless, nor to individuals under the age of sixteen.173 This restriction was absent from the original 
proposal, but was added by the left wing of the lower chamber of the Dutch Parliament during the 
final voting on the proposal.174 The authors of the amendment were concerned that the original 
proposal itself did not limit the applicability of the law to a certain age, nor did it include such 
protection indirectly through criminal law as had been the case with the 2016 amendment.175 
Finally, it must be noted that the new Article 14(4) is a temporary measure. Article IA of the 
amendment automatically removes subsection 4 from Article 14 after five years in March 2022 due 
to the intrusiveness of the measure.176  
                                                 
170 Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice, ‘Minister Blok trekt Nederlanderschap in van 4 personen’ (13 September 
2017), online: <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/ministeries/ministerie-van-justitie-en-
veiligheid/nieuws/2017/09/13/minister-blok-trekt-nederlanderschap-in-van-vier-personen>. 
171 ECtHR, K2 v The United Kingdom, no. 42387/12, 7 February 2017. 
172 For an elaborate discussion of K2 and its relevance for the recent Dutch Amendment see TL Boekestein and GR de 
Groot, “K2 t. het Verenigd Koninkrijk”, (2017) European Human Rights Cases 2017/146, at 6 et seq.   
173 Article 14(4) DNA. 
174 Bill 34356, nr. 6 supra note 133, Nr. 2 Voorstel van Rijkswet, Article II and Nr. 29 Amendement van het lid 
Gesthuizen c.s.; Stemming Intrekken Nederlanderschap in belang van de nationale veiligheid 24 May 2016, 
Handelingen 2015-2016, nr. 86, item 12. 
175 Bill 34356, nr. 6 supra note 133, Nr. 29; in contrast to the 2016 amendment, the 2017 amendment is disconnected 
from criminal law, and its applicability thus not restricted by the age restrictions on liability in article 77a, b DCC. 
176 Article II(1) Rijkswet van 10 februari 2017 supra note 10; note that this was not part of the original bill; Bill 34356, 
nr. 6 supra note 133, Nr. 24 Gewijzigd amendement van het lid Recourt ter vervanging van dat gedrukt onder nr. 14. 
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D. CRITIQUE  
Much like their Canadian counterpart, both recent amendments in the Netherlands have attracted a 
substantial amount criticism, most of which is directed at the more recent amendment. Although 
the two laws differ in nature (reactive v proactive), most of the critique raised can be applied to 
both acts and the amendments will therefore be addressed together.  
A first point of criticism has already been addressed in Section 3.3 and been referred to as 
the “race for revocation” or “export of the problem”. Clearly, neither of the Dutch amendments is 
directed at resolving the threat posed by foreign fighters properly. Rather, both simply export the 
problem to the country of the individual’s other nationality. This approach merely prevents harm 
by hindering the individual in legally re-entering the country. It is however incapable of eliminating 
the actual threat the individual poses. Additionally, where several states adopt such legislation, it 
may lead to a “race for revocation” through which both countries of nationality seek to expatriate 
the individual before the other. Such a race is most likely won by the state with the harshest laws 
and the lowest standards of protection, neither of which is desirable from a human rights 
perspective. Additionally, the laws will likely cause the individual remaining with the terrorist 
organization longer and might even result in the creation of new terrorist organizations in the 
countries of remaining nationality.177 The 2017 amendment in particular is based on short-sighted, 
insufficient, and ineffective attempt to prevent the return of the foreign fighter in exchange for a 
feeling of security. A second issue applicable to both amendments is that it remains unanswered 
why the current criminal law measures are insufficient to deal with the problem, even despite the 
alleged gaps in extra-territorial enforcement. Whilst penal sanctions are still to a limited extent part 
of the 2016 amendment, they are disregarded entirely under the new law.178 Most notably, the 
Dutch Council of State has uttered serious concerns in this regard, referring to the extensive 
possibilities of imposing criminal law sanctions on individuals long before an actual attack has 
been committed under the current DCC179 and questioning why these measures are deemed 
                                                 
177 GR De Groot and O Vonk, “De ontneming van het Nederlanderschap wegens jihadistische activiteiten”, (2015) 6 
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insufficient.180 Proactive deprivation of nationality prevents the individual from returning in the 
first place and makes the extraterritorial application of Dutch Criminal law impossible. The 
application of the wide range of available criminal law sanctions becomes impossible. Should the 
foreign fighter nevertheless succeed in returning to the Netherlands, prosecution for the crimes 
committed abroad would not be possible. After all, Dutch Criminal Law is only applicable to those 
who commit terrorist offences abroad who are Dutch nationals.181 For these reasons, the Council 
of State deemed the 2017 amendment to be of insufficient benefit to the existing approach.182  
Furthermore, Dutch scholars have raised concerns that the measure in itself may be 
considered a form of penal sanction (e.g. banishment), similarly to their Canadian colleagues.183 
Although, the measure falls within the realm of administrative law, it is similar to a criminal law 
punishment in nature, but can be imposed without the need to adhere to the standards and 
safeguards of criminal procedure. Nevertheless, despite the intrusiveness measures and their 
limited effectiveness, the most pressing problem they pose is that of discrimination. The problem 
applies to the two Dutch amendments in a similar fashion as it does to the SCCA. Both Dutch 
measures can only target multi-nationals, as application to mono-nationals is prohibited.184 The 
issue is especially pressing with regard to the Dutch amendments. The list of terrorist organizations 
whose members may be stripped of the nationality is highly very limited and specifically directed 
at Islamist terrorist groups such as Al-Qaida and ISIS.185 In light of research into the background 
of foreign fighters that join these organizations in particular, it is clear that individuals of ethnic 
Arab background are more likely to be targeted than other dual-nationals.186 Consequently, they 
are at least implicitly targeted and indirectly discriminated against by the new amendments.187 
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Legal scholars have stated that, in light of these three primary concerns, the deployment of 
nationality law in against foreign fighters and terrorism by the Netherlands remains insufficiently 
motivated, especially when considering the fact that both criminal law and the Dutch Passport Act 
seem to provide proper, less intrusive, and better safeguarded measures to address the problem.188 
Experts fear that the expatriation of foreign fighters will not only radicalize them further, but also 
raise that counter-terrorism agencies will likely miss out on from gathering valuable information 
from returnees.189  
Despite the harsh criticism raised in legal doctrine, it must be noted that some of the issues 
raised with regard to Bill C-24 are not, or only to a small degree, applicable to the two Dutch 
amendments. Firstly, the Dutch 2016 amendment on reactive denationalization does not contain an 
equivalent to deprivation of nationality following a conviction for certain offences in a foreign 
country. Issues relating to the possible absence of fair trial standards, abuse of power, or 
persecution of the political opposition, that have been raised in connection to Bill C-24 are thus not 
applicable.190 Secondly, both Dutch amendments offer a certain degree of protection to minors. 
Under the 2016 amendment, protection is afforded indirectly through the DCC and its age 
restrictions on criminal responsibility.191 Under the 2017 amendment, direct protection is 
guaranteed: the new Article 14(4) DNA only allows for expatriation of those above the age of 
sixteen. Although it remains possible to revoke the nationality of youths under the age of majority, 
a certain degree of protection is nevertheless afforded. Unfortunately, the second issue raised by 
UNICEF in this regard relating to cases where parents are expatriated, and children thus forced to 
leave the country or to be separated, are equally applicable in the Netherlands.192 However, these 
concerns are counterbalanced where children hold EU citizenship, as this will grant an additional 
degree of protection, and may even prohibit the Netherlands from expelling the parent at all.193 
The final point of criticism directed at the SCCA addressed its insufficient standard of 
protection against statelessness. The DNA affords more protection than its Canadian counterpart. 
Whilst under Section 10.4 CCA it is for the individual to proof that he is not the citizen of a country 
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of which the minister has reasonable grounds to believe he is, Article 14(8) DNA sets forth a stricter 
standard: it simply states that expatriation is not possible where it would result in statelessness.  
V. EXPLAINING THE ANTITHETICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN CANADA AND THE 
NETHERLANDS 
The above analysis has shown that originally, both Canada and the Netherlands relied only on 
reactive deprivation of nationality to strengthen their counter-terrorism efforts. Since 2017, 
however, both countries are undergoing antithetical developments. Whereas the Canadian 
legislature has adopted Bill C-6, which removes any form of denationalization as a means to 
counter terrorism from the Canadian Citizenship Act, the Netherlands has strengthened its efforts 
to utilize deprivation of nationality in fighting the threat posed by returning foreign fighters. 
Comparing the two systems could thus not yield more antithetical results. Before the 2017 
amendment, the possibility of depriving Dutch nationals of the citizenship was more restricted 
compared to its Canadian pendant. This has changed fundamentally. Dutch and Canadian laws on 
deprivation of nationality are now developing in opposite direction. In light of the above survey, 
the developments in Canada seem to be unique. While not all of the countries discussed 
denationalize foreign fighters or convicted terrorists, the abolition of such laws shortly after their 
adoption clearly moves against the ongoing trend to extend such legislation. This raises the 
question why Canada has moved away from denationalization, whereas similar laws have been 
maintained and even extended in the Netherlands? In light of the debate that accompanied the 
adoption of Bill C-6, it seemed that the primary reason was the perception that the old law had 
created two classes of Canadians; mono-nationals whose citizenship was irrevocable and dual-
nationals whose was not.194 Furthermore, when viewing the old denationalization law in the context 
of the overall counter-terrorism approach within which it operated, it is also clear that the measure 
did not fit into it. Denationalization is difficult to reconcile with a strong emphasis on criminal law 
and the prosecution of terrorism as an offence, because it is an administrative sanction operating 
outside of the criminal courts. Furthermore, a criminal law approach implies and emphasis on 
punishment and rehabilitation, which are difficult to reconcile with denationalization given that in 
light of its exclusionary nature it has the potential to undermine both by simply removing the 
individual from society and territory. This applies equally to the development in the Netherlands, 
especially with regard to the 2017 amendment.  
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In the above discussion, it has become clear that denationalization is an integral part of the 
Dutch approach to counter the threat posed by foreign fighters, which targets the prevention of 
their return in particular. As Dutch criminal legislation on terrorism is more limited than its 
Canadian counterpart, especially with regard to extra-territorial application and preventive arrests, 
the measure fits well into the Country’s overall carrot-and-stick-approach to foreign fights and the 
different strategies that apply to foreign fighters who have and have not returned to the country. As 
an essential part of this policy, the 2017 amendment closes the gap previously left by the factual 
ineffectiveness of prosecuting foreign fighters for crimes committed abroad before their return to 
the Netherlands. This approach is in stark contrast with the Canadian approach, which is almost 
exclusively centered around criminal law, relies on a multitude of specific terrorism offences, and 
defines ordinary crimes as terrorist activity where they are committed in a terrorist context. The 
effectiveness of the Canadian approach against domestic terrorism and retuning foreign fighters 
alike is further supplemented by the broad scope and low requirements for preventive detention.195 
As discussed, this strategy views terrorism as a crime and addresses it accordingly. Especially in 
the ‘respond’ dimension, there is thus hardly any room for non-criminal law measures. Arguably, 
the disruptive effect of denationalization is much greater in the Canadian approach where the 
prosecution of extra-territorial terrorism offences requires a link through nationality or residence. 
While this is also true for the Netherlands, its decision to adopt differing approaches to domestic 
terrorism and Dutch terrorists abroad circumvents most of these shortcomings. By focusing on the 
prevention of the return all together, the prosecution of returnees becomes moot. It is thus not 
surprising that the Netherlands have opted for an alternative approach to remedy the lacuna and 
simply sidestep it. On the other hand, and in light of the Canada’s general approach, it is also no 
surprise that Bill C-24 was reversed. The measure never fit into the counter-terrorism strategy to 
begin with, nor was it originally intended to be directed at terrorism specifically. Rather, it was 
later on viewed as a tool to punish terrorists and disrupt their activities.196 In light of this, the 
changes introduced by Bill C-24 must be viewed as a misguided attempt to keep up with a 
misperception of the approach adopted by other NATO countries. The Bill did not offer any 
particular benefits to security whilst simultaneously creating two different classes of Canadian 
citizenship and its many shortcomings led to the reversion of the amendment just three years later. 
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In contrast, the developments in the Netherlands fit well into the overall strategy and the specific 
effort of prevent terrorism as early as possible. In light of this and the prioritization of collective 
security over individual rights and liberties, the introduction of proactive denationalization is 
coherent with the overall strategy.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The now largely reverted Bill C-24 was the Canadian counterpart to the Dutch 2016 Amendment, 
both being measures of reactive deprivation of nationality. While similar functioning and effect, 
the two measures differed in some respects. Denationalization under the pre-2017 section 10(2)(b) 
CCA was broader in scope than the Dutch law, as convictions abroad could also trigger revocation. 
Furthermore, the two laws allow for deprivation of nationality on different criminal law grounds. 
Whilst under the pre-2017 Section 10(2)(b) CCA any conviction carrying a sentence of more than 
five years could trigger denationalization, the Dutch law lists the offences for which expatriation 
is possible and explicitly refers to specific terrorism offences, albeit without a minimum term 
requirement. A final major difference could be found when looking at the safeguards against 
statelessness. Here, Dutch law seems to provide stronger protection as it does not, in contrast to the 
pre-2017 CCA, create a complex system by shifting the onus of proof after reasonable grounds to 
belief that another citizenship can be obtained have been established by the minister. Rather, the 
Dutch law pragmatically states that deprivation of nationality is simply not possible where 
statelessness would be the result.  
The above discussion of the synergies and divergences between Canada and the 
Netherland’s general approach to terrorism, as well as the use of denationalization specifically, has 
revealed that the underlying strategy to address the foreign fighter threat of both countries also 
differ and provide good explanations for the different developments. It has been demonstrated that 
the pre-2017 Section 10(2)(b) CCA never sat well with the Canadian anti-terrorism strategy to 
begin with. In light of the criminal-law centered approach with its extensive extra-territorial 
application and preventive detention powers, the introduction of reactive denationalization was 
neither necessary nor appropriate. In contrast, the use of reactive and proactive deprivation of 
nationality fits well into the overall Dutch strategy that does not focus on criminal law exclusively 
in its particularly harsh stance towards foreign fighters, seeking to prevent their return at all costs.  
 Ultimately, both developments can be explained by reference to their respective countries’ 
overall counter-terrorism strategies. However, the wide criticisms that have been raised with 
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regards to both criminal and nationality law measures must not be neglected. Especially in light of 
the serious concerns and objections that have been raised against reactive and proactive deprivation 
of nationality, which ultimately contributed to the adoption of Bill C-6, the use of such measures 
should be strongly opposed. Indeed, the Canadian counter-terrorism strategy demonstrates that 
denationalization of (suspected) terrorists is neither necessary nor desirable. Therefore, this paper 
suggests that the Netherlands follow the recent amendments to the Canadian Citizenship Act and 
repeal the 2017 amendment as soon as possible. If not, it is very well possible that the law is struck 
down for violating EU law or the ECHR. While there are no cases on the matter yet, it is not 
unlikely that a decision depriving an alleged foreign fighter of his nationality will be challenged in 
the near future, particularly in light of K2 v the UK. However, this does not imply that the 
Netherlands should introduce an excessively intrusive criminal law measure such as preventive 
detention. Until the measure is struck down by a Court, it is very likely that the Dutch Government 
will continue to insist on denationalization as a counter-terrorism measure. From a global 
perspective, it even seems likely that these powers will be expanded.  
